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Some Aspects and Implications of the
Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative ProcedureBy

RALPH

F.

FUCHt

THE COMMITTEE'S REPORT

I shall not use many words in telling about the history and
the contents of the Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, with which most of you
are probably familiar already.' The report was made last
January, after almost two years of work by a committee of
eleven lawyers, some of them practitioners, some teachers, and
some in official positions. The work of the Committee would
have been impossible without the aid and guidance of its fulltime staff. The 27 monographs prepared by the staff upon
individual agencies, together with additional information contained in the appendices to the Report, constitute a unique and
invaluable body of data in regard to administrative procedure,
upon which the Report itself draws heavily.
The Report deals, as you know, with the procedure of Federal administrative agencies in their bearing upon private persons and property. A good many of the principal Report's
more than 2oo pages are devoted to an account of the development of administrative processes, to a statement of the reasons
for various classes of administrative agencies, and to a discussion of the characteristics of the agencies themselves and of
their procedure, which spring from these reasons. A great deal
of emphasis is placed upon the vast bulk of matters that is
* Address before the Annual Dinner of the Ohio State University College
of Law, Columbus, Ohio, May 16, 1941.
t Professor of Law, Washington University, St. Louis, Mo. Member
Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure.
1 The Report is outlined in a summary prepared by the chairman of the
Committee, Dean Acheson, and published in the March, 194.1, issue of the
American Bar Association Journal, at p. 143.
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disposed of by the agencies informally, without resort to
methods calling for the use of hearings or other formalized
proceedings. It is also recognized in the Report that the relatively small percentage of matters calling for formal proceedings is very significant, because of the character of the issues and
interests involved and, often, because the decisions reached
have permanent importance as regulations or precedents for
the future. Accordingly, much space is devoted to a discussion
of procedure in such matters and to recommendations for its
improvement.
The Recommendations and Their Purposes

Procedure is discussed separately in the Report as to rulemaking and as to adjudication. As regards the former, the use
on a large scale of conferences and other devices which perform
the same functions as hearings is recorded and commended;
but it is noted that hearings have become frequent in the fixing
of prices and wages, the prescription of rules for the construction
of vessels and other instruments of transportation, the regulation of the ingredients and physical properties of food, the
prescription of commodity standards, and the regulation of
competitive practices. Their use in connection with these types
of regulations is regarded as desirable and it is stated that,
without a general statutory requirement, it should become
"standard administrative practice."
As regards formal adjudication, the report has a great deal
to say about detailed points of evidence and procedure. In
addition, in order to improve the conduct of adjudicatory hearings and to relieve the burden upon agency heads who now
regard themselves in many instances as obliged to decide each
controverted case themselves, the creation of a class of "hearing
officers" attached to each agency and empowered to conduct
hearings and arrive at initial decisions is recommended. To lend
weight to the position of hearing officer, which would replace
that of the present trial examiners and referees, it is recom-
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mended that, except for those handling small cases in certain
agencies, they be paid salaries of $75oo, hold office for seven
years, be appointed by a recommended Office of Federal Administrative Procedure upon nomination by the agencies, and
be removable only by the Office for cause. The Office would
be headed by a Director and would have as its other two members an Associate Justice of the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia and the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts. In addition to its
powers with respect to the hearing officers, the Office would
keep itself informed of the procedure of the several agencies
and would recommend improvements.
Four members of the Attorney General's Committee, although they agree that the foregoing recommendations would
operate to improve the administrative process and concur in the
Committee's Report, feel that additional points and recommendations should be made. In two separate supplementary
statements-one by a single member and the other by the other
three, in which the former also concurs, they stress the view
that it would be ideal if a separation of "prosecuting" and of
deciding functions could be achieved. Failing that, the hearing
officers should, one of these members believes, be made wholly
independent of the agencies they serve, except for the reviewability of their decisions by the agency heads; while the other
three members would enlarge slightly the degree of independence which the principal report suggests. These members,
moreover, propose a code of administrative procedure for
enactment by Congress, the several sections of which require or
direct the agencies, as the case may be, to observe specified procedural practices in the successive stages of the various types
of proceedings.

Most of the recommendations just mentioned are designed
partly, although by no means wholly, to introduce additional
safeguards to private interests into administrative procedure
of the more formal type and so to improve the quality of ad-
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ministration itself and to increase public satisfaction with it.
These are the more striking recommendations, both because of
incorporation of most of them into the bills which accompany
the Committee's report and the additional statement agreed
to by the four members. Some commentators seem to have concluded that these recommendations are the only ones worthy
of mention and that they express the whole substance of the
Committee's thought about the administrative process. Such
is not the case. Throughout the report, in comments and recommendations that received the attention of the entire Committee and represent its considered conclusions, emphasis is
placed upon the need of furthering efficiency, along with safeguards to private interest, in the work of the agencies. This
work and the procedure that is adapted to it are viewed, not
as evils to be hemmed in as much as possible, but as means of
achieving ends set by Congress and hence as entitled to wholehearted acceptance.
Thus the Committee says at the very outset that "Powers
must be effectively exercised in the public interest," as well as
that "they must not be arbitrarily exercised." The conclusion
is that "Procedures must be judged by their contribution to the
achievement of these ends." The extension of the use of
informal methods of disposing of cases and the use of competent
and well-paid hearing officers where formal proceedings are
resorted to are urged both in the public interest and for the sake
of the private interests concerned in the proceedings. In reporting upon procedural problems incident to formal adjudication
the Committee points to the need for expedition and "the full
utilization of concentrated experience" on the part of the
agencies, as well as to the necessity of fairness to private
interests. The discussion of administrative rule-making recognizes the need of bringing administrative knowledge and
experience fully into play, as well as of permitting private
interests to participate when they have a stake which needs to
be protected in this manner. Finally, of course, the conclusion
COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE
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of the majority of the Committee that existing regulatory
agencies should not be separated into independent "prosecuting"
and adjudicatory branches rests upon the need for effective,
consistent enforcement as well as upon the view that private
interests would suffer from uncertainty and increased litigation
if the separation were to be affected.
REACTIONS TO THE REPORT

The reactions to the Committee's Report that have thus far
been recorded fall, as might have been expected, into two
classes. The first consists of the reactions of many practicing
lawyers, typified by that of the American Bar Association;
the second consists of the reactions of certain law teachers
in law review articles and of the agencies themselves as expressed to the sub-committee of the Senate Judiciary Committee which has been conducting hearings recently upon the
bills emanating from the Attorney General's Committee. The
House of Delegates of the Bar Association, meeting in March,
adopted a statement of the principles which, it was felt, should
govern Congress in the enactment of legislation dealing with
administrative procedure. These principles emphasize protection to private interest. The academic commentators and the
agencies; on the other hand, although they approve most of the
Committee's statements, are concerned about the effects of some
of the proposals of the Committee upon the ability of the
administrative agencies to discharge their functions efficiently.
In particular, concern is expressed over the increased independence and semi-judicial dignity that would be given to the trial
examiners. The agency heads, it is felt, even though they
would retain full power to substitute their decisions for those
of the hearing officers, might develop a hesitancy to substitute
their conclusions, for those of virtually irremovable, highcalibre men who had heard and considered the evidence and for
whose conclusions the courts, upon judicial review of the
records containing these conclusions, might display a consider-
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able fondness. Thus the boldness and consistency of policy
which is essential to effective regulation and which is achieved
at present through unified direction and decision by agency
heads might, it is felt, be threatened. At other points too, as
in the Committee's warmth toward the use of hearings in
certain types of rule-making proceedings, some of these commentators see a threat to effective administration.
These divergent reactions to some of the proposals of the
Attorney General's Committee are, of course, not expressive
of any new philosophies in respect to administrative procedure
or, indeed, to the exercise of governmental powers generally.
The Committee's Report and the bills that accompany it
simply furnish a new focus for discussion at the same time that,
one may hope, they provide proposals upon the basis of which
all may in the end come to agree. To find out what the chances
of agreement really are, it is worth while to examine briefly
into the foundations of the practitioners' attitude on the one
hand and the academic-administrative attitude on the otherrecognizing, of course, that the two groups are by no means
mutually exclusive.
COMMITTEE
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Bases of the Divergent Attitudes

What I am calling the practitioners' attitude is, I think we
all recognize, in part a carrying forward of the traditional
liberal principles of government-the principles of John Locke,
John Stuart Mill, Herbert Spencer, and Justices Field, Peckham, and Sutherland. These principles, are compounded of
a desire to limit government and a strong belief in the
benefits of free private enterprise. Principles, however, do not
carry forward through decades and centuries merely because
they sound good. It is necessary that they have current validity
if they are to retain the allegiance of men, as these traditional
prinicples have retained the allegiance of many lawyers. The
current validity of laissez faire liberalism is best appreciated
from the standpoint of private business enterprise; and this
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brings me to a second element in the practitioners' attitude
of which I am speaking. This is the element which springs
from the fact by far the greater part of the bar is occupied, in
its contacts with government, in representing private interests,
either in dealings with the government itself or in competing
with other private interests for the judgments of courts or for
favorable determination from administrative agencies. One
engaged in this work necessarily comes to appreciate the problems of clients who are attempting to discharge their responsibilities-many of them legally imposed-to stockholders,
employees, and consumers. He comes, too, to fear the danger
of arbitrary administrative action by government, which may
upset carefully-devised plans and destroy legitimate interests.
The work of the bar properly lies in just this area of the
relationships between government and private interests. The
procedural law which governs these relationships so far as the
executive branch of the government is concerned, we distinguish
from the remainder of the law applicable to the methods of that
branch and call administrative law. It lies peculiarly within
the province of lawyers as distinguished from public administrators. To it the Attorney General's Committee, made up
wholly of lawyers, confined itself. To the report of the Committee other lawyers will naturally react, in the first instance,
according to the consciousness they have, by reason of training
and experience, of the public interest on the one hand and of
private interest on the other. Some lawyers must be constantly
watchful to protect private interests against government. Many
lawyers, as attorneys for the government, view matters from
the other side of the fence. Some lawyers manage to maintain
a balanced attitude which takes account of all of the competing
considerations. The Attorney General's Committee was made
up to secure, if possible, a balance among its members, if not
on the part of each member separately. The very large measure
of agreement among its members shows the possibility of
achieving a balanced solution of procedural problems.
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Be that as it may, the other attitude which I am calling the
academic-administrative attitude toward the report of the Committee differs from the practitioners' in its greater emphasis
upon the need of safeguarding the efficient performance of the
public functions of the administrative agencies. Those lawyers
who serve the Government and its agencies are naturally conscious of the need of effectively accomplishing the ends the
agencies were set up to serve, and this consciousness has extended to many teachers of administrative law in the law schools
of the country. As the report of the Attorney General's Committee points out, "Taken together, the various Federal administrative agencies have the responsibility for making good to
the people of the country a major part of the gains of a
hundred and fifty years of democratic government." Each
agency has its share of the common task-this one to curb
possible abuses on the part of economically powerful groups,
that one to assist in the safe and smooth functioning of an
industiy, and another to distribute directly to those entitled
to them some of the benefits of the common life together of
the American people. Administrators and those who have
studied administrative procedure with full consciousness of the
import of this situation cannot but be watchful lest the ability
of the agencies to discharge their functions be impaired.
And so, as I have said, divergent reactions to the Report of
the Attorney General's Committee naturally arise within the
legal profession. Different groups, perceiving most dearly
different aspects of the problem of administrative justice,
welcome those recommendations that seem to be designed to
provide better for the aspects they have in mind and to be
distrustful of the recommendations that might militate against
these aspects. This situation is no different from those that
generally arise when controversal matters are presented to
the profession and to the country for solution.
COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
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The Bases of Reconciliation

We cannot, however, stop at this point. Conflict must be
resolved and a solution found. And, as is usually the case, the
possibility of reconciliation exists if we can succeed in probing
to the still deeper factors that are present, underlying those
that lead to divergence of attitude. For of course it is true,
here as elsewhere, that public and private interest, properly
viewed, are not antagonistic in the long run. The public has a
stake in the welfare of each private enterprise and individual;
private interest, on the other hand, can be fully realized only
in the setting of a healthy society.
Administrative proceedings are but instances of an over-all
problem. That is the problem of giving due recognition on the
one hand to claim to the preservation and advancement of
personal or property rights which may be destroyed if care is
not taken and, on the other hand, to the claim of society that
certain short-run advantages be surrendered for the sake of
the general welfare. If the right balance is struck between
these claims, everyone concerned will be better off from every
legitimate point of view.
In relation to the most controversial of the legislative proposals of the Attorney General's Committee, that which relates
to the establishment of hearing officers and an Office of Federal
Administrative Procedure, it is evident that both groups of the
legal profession are correct in their principal factual assertions.
It is true that a hearing officer will not afford as insulated a
forum for the adjudication of controversies as a court of law.
These officers will receive their positions as a result of their
initial selection by the agencies they serve; they will be subject
to possible removal for cause by the Office at the behest of the
agencies, as well as of the public, and to non-reappointment at
the will of the agencies; their decisions will be subject to full
review by the agency heads; and they will be definitely within
the agencies and in contact with the remainder of the personnel
except, so far as a particular case is concerned, with the personnel
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that has taken part in the preparation and presentation of that
case. It is true, on the other hand, that the hearing officer will
have been appointed, not by the agency, but by the Office of
Federal Administrative Procedure after investigation of his
qualifications; that he will not be subject to removal or change
of salary during his term of office, except to removal by the
Office for cause; that his decisions will be final unless reviewed;
and that in reviewing them the heads of the agency and the
courts will pay deference to his conclusions of fact and to his
reasoning, to the extent, at least, that these are legitimately
influenced by first-hand observation of witnesses.
It may also be true, however, as the Committee believes
it is, that affected private parties, as well as the public interest,
will receive more consistent, expeditious, and informed treatment at the hands of these hearing officers than they could at
the hands of still more detached officers. It may develop also
that, not only will the agency heads be relieved of a vast burden
of work they now attempt to carry, but in addition that the
hearing officers will develop more dean-cut records than those
often produced at present by trial examiners and that increased
satisfaction by affected private parties with the handling of
their cases will redound to the advantage of the agencies'
accomplishment of their purposes. In short, better administration for all concerned may result from a solution to procedural
problems that takes account of the legitimate demands of all,
than could result, even from the standpoint of each interest
alone, if the solution were patterned after its own conception
of its needs. Such, at any rate, must be the hope of sincere
students of the problem; and the attempt to reach such a result
must now be the whole-hearted concern of the legal profession
and of Congress.
CONSEQUENCES AND FUTURE NEEDS

Indispensable to the solution of this and of other national
problems is the realization that more is at stake than appears
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immediately. Especially in law and government, our entire
democratic way of life is bound up with the solution of each
major problem. This fact becomes especially dear in relation
to administrative justice when we reflect that the principal
objects of concern, fairness to individual interests and successful
attainment of common objectives, are the twin purposes of the
social order itself. We cannot have the only kind of civilization
we are interested in building up and maintaining if we cannot
supply and preserve individual opportunity and rights and at
the safie time achieve full cooperative effort in our common
tasks. Our traditional social philosophy has emphasized the
former; the present threat to our system emphasizes the latter.
If we insist too rigidly upon the accustomed means of safeguarding private interest, our way of life will perish because
we cannot efficiently secure either the human needs of the
people or defense against external enemies. If we become
ruthless in pursuing immediately-felt social needs, we shall
sacrifice that individual welfare which is the proclaimed endpurpose of our democratic system.
To an increasingly evident extent, the system of administrative justice which we have worked out and which it is now
proposed to improve, is an alternative not only to a more
highly judicialized system but also to a swift-moving executive
system. We have resorted to the executive system before in
time of war; we have gone back to it now on a considerable scale
during the national emergency. By means of the expansion
of the Chief Executive's office and the exertion of his powers
through that office, there have recently been instituted farreaching price and priority controls over much of industry; and
these are susceptible of extension to much of the national life.
The exercise of these powers, so far as one not closely in touch
with their effects can see, has on the whole been fair and considerate. It is a fact, however, that that exercise is largely unattended by legally-secured procedural safeguards, such as the
right to be heard before action is taken. There are political
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safeguards and safeguards residing in the disposition of the
people and of officials, but few which it is the legislativelyprescribed duty of officials or of judges to maintain or which
there exist remedies to enforce.
Were the times more settled, we could rest reasonably
secure in the belief that the system of executive justice would
again pass largely out of existence when the present emergency
was past. It is a fact, however, that an emergency of a different
sort, which administrative agencies and administrative law have
not solved, has existed since 1999; and it is likely that even
graver dislocations will exist when the present international
emergency has ended. All that we have yet succeeded in doing
through the expansion of the Federal credit and the use of
administrative agencies during the period of the New Deal and
before has been to mitigate some of the worst maladjustments
in our system. A start has been made in securing a better
distribution of welfare and in conserving national resources;
but that is all. Underconsumption and underproduction in
relation to both need and potential accomplishment have continued; and it is an open question whether, had the international
threat not appeared, we would have had the wit to achieve
a more adequate solution to our problems through the use of
democratic methods. If that is true, and if it is true that even
graver problems confront us in the years ahead, we have no
assurance that the system of safeguarded administrative justice
can be our main governmental reliance in the future, as it has
been until now. It may be necessary to continue and extend the
system of executive justice instead, with what possibility of
procedural fairness we know not. In this situation, and not in
the inner disposition of anyone that may be in power now or
in the future, lies the greatest danger to our democratic way
of life. To meet it we must obviously, not only frame more
adequate economic policies, but attack with redoubled vigor and
determination the problem of administrative justice, which lies
peculiarly within our professional competence as lawyers, so
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as to create a system sufficient for the tasks of today and tomorrow, furnishing a real alternative to the more hazardous
executive system.
In this connection, there is one aspect of the executive
system which displays, at least potentially, a definite superiority
over the administrative system. If the administrative system is
to compete successfully, its corresponding deficiency is in need
of remedy. The Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure did not concern itself with this aspect of the
problem because it was not asked to and because, in any event,
the need has hardly been felt by the public, nor has it entered,
as yet, into the professional consciousness of lawyers. I refer
to the need of over-all direction, without which the efforts of
the several regulatory agencies cannot be successfully coordinated or geared to the national objectives. You cannot with
sufficient wisdom or effectiveness regulate rates or wages or
prices unless the policies of the regulatory agencies are coordinated5 and you cannot do all of these together unless you
proceed in the light of monetary and credit policy and of policy
in managing the volume of agricultural production. It is clear
that sooner or later the unification of major policy in the
several areas of economic regulation must be achieved. The
problem of how to achieve it in the administrative system is
partly a problem of organization and procedure that affects
private interests directly. As such it falls within the professional purview of lawyers as well as of experts in public
administration.
In the executive system, as contrasted with the administrative system we have been studying, coordination can be accomplished through the Chief Executive or through such agencies
as he may establish. At present the defense effort is being
handled in this way (whether adequately or inadequately is
beside the point just here), and there is no doubt about the
power of the President or those to whom he delegates his
authority to control the policies of the several branches of the
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Government that are participating in the common effort. Army,
Navy, Coast Guard, Draft Administration, 0. P. M., and
others can be made to work together in dealing with private
interests as well as in other respects.
In relation to the administrative system, the political scientists have been ahead of the lawyers in realizing this need,
though not, I happen personally to believe, in devising effective
means of meeting it. The report of the President's Committee
COMMITTEE
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on Administrative Management in January, 1937, contains an

eloquent plea for over-all executive direction of all the Federal
administrative agencies, for the "one grand purpose" of making
"democracy work today in our National Government; that is
to make our Government an up-to-date, efficient, and effective
instrument for carrying out the will of the Nation," with "a
responsible and effective chief executive as the center of direction, energy, and administrative management." The Committee's famous denunciation of the independent regulatory
agencies as a "headless fourth branch of the government" led,
you will, recall, to the proposal that all of the agencies be
gathered into twelve departments, with a cabinet officer at the
head of each, responsible to the President. To preserve and,
indeed, increase judicial detachment in administrative adjudication, however, each existing agency was to give birth to a
purely decision-making agency within a department, which was
to be relieved of all "administrative" duties and carefully insulated from executive pressure in reaching its decisions. The
Committee did not succeed in explaining how the President
was to succeed in the task, obviously impossible for one man,
of coordinating the policies of so vast an administrative machine
or how his policy, if and when he formulated it, could become
effective through the decisions of insulated boards that would
not be under compulsion to follow it. Nevertheless, the need
which the Committee saw is actually existing today. Sooner or
later-better soon than later-the need must be met in a
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manner appropriate to the administrative system if that system
is to prove adequate to the national need.
I shall not be so bold as to venture a concrete proposal for
meeting this need of over-all direction of the policies of administrative regulation. Whether the device of the future should
be a super-commission of representatives of the agencies
engaged in economic regulation or whether it should be a central economic council made up of independent experts, I cannot
say. Whether it should be advisory or exercise authority over
the agencies, I do not know. Whether it should be under the
President or independent of him, taking due account of the
political will as expressed through Congress and through him,
I am likewise uninformed. My point is that we should start
thinking of this problem and attempting as lawyers, in conjunction with economists and political scientists, to solve it.
To the foregoing end I wish to suggest too that up to now
we have not had a legal or political philosophy adequate to
such an attempt or to the other administrative problems that
lie ahead. Even the most advanced in our profession have
talked of its task in terms of a "balancing of interests," meaning
thereby an adjustment of particular controversies in such a
manner as to weigh justly the different specific claims advanced
and to give effect to as many as possible of those that seem
legitimate. Even the legislative process has been viewed in
the latest and most respected works upon it as essentially an
adjudication of competing demands, and the legislature has
been likened to a court in which these demands may be advanced. It lies in the background, of course, that interests and
demands must be weighed in the scale of some system of values
and that this system derives from some dominating policy. But
this fact has been much minimized, and at times it seems to
have been assumed that the process is largely one of effecting
whatever compromise may "get by," rather than of carrying
out any other public purpose than somehow keeping the peace.
The foregoing conception of the work of law is all too often
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true to the facts, and it may even suffice for less stressful times
than the presenti but it will not do for the period ahead. We
are faced with sterner tasks than simply living together as
pleasantly as possible in a world where each is satisfied, on the
whole, with what the prevailing institutions provide for him.
We must create a world in which masses of men cooperatively
carry on vast enterprises for purposes that are democratically
determined and, therefore, are both regardful of individual
interests and primary in their importance. When these purposes have been determined, they cannot be compromised but
must permeate throughout the law and its administration,
shaping doctrines and procedures to accord with them. A legal
profession worthy of such a task must be constantly conscious
of the purposes with which its functions are shot through. If
that does not come to be the case, we cannot stand united; and
divided we fall. In relation to administrative procedure our
dominating resolve must be to make the system work to serve
both the general welfare and that individual welfare which is
inextricably bound up with it, as the national will demands.

